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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CONTINENTAL THRIFT AND
LOAN COMP ANY,
PlatiJn,tijf a;nd Appellaint,
-vs.JOHN L. ALLEN and
PHYLLIS S. ALLEN,
Def endarnts arnd
Third Party Plaintiffs,
-vs.-

Case
No.11299

WILLLIAM KELSON and
ROY COLLARD,
Third Party Defendoots,
and
MAURICE ANDERSON,
Jn.tervenor and Respondent.

AP'P·ELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves an action by plaintiff and appellant who obtained a judgment against defendants and
also Rn assignment of a judgment obtained by defendants
against third party defendant, Roy Collard. Plaintiff
and appellant executed upon an automobile registered
in the name of Roy Collard and Maurice Anderson.
1

Maurice Anderson intervened in the action claiming that
the automobile was owned solely by him.
The question presented for determination herein is
whether or not Roy Collard owned any interest in the
automobile and, if so, what the extent of that ownership interest was.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Intervenor obtained an Order to Show Cause based
upon his affidavit seeking an order directing plaintiff and
appellant to release the custody of the automobile in
question and to deliver possession of same to him. Upon
a hearing of the matter the District Court of Salt Lake
County issued its order directing that plaintiff forthwith
release possession of the automobile and deliver it to
intervenor. It is from this order that plaintiff and
appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks a reversal of the order of the lower
court and reinstatement of the order of execution originally entered by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 1, 1964, plaintiff obtained a judgment
against defendants, John L. Allen and Phyllis Allen, for
the sum of $8,703.88. At the same time, defendants obtained a judgment against third party defendant, Hoy
Collard for the same amount as the judgment that 1r11~

'
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rendered against him (R. 1). Later, on January 11,
1965, defendants, Allen, assigned their judgment against
third party defendant, Collard, to plaintiff (R. 3). Pursuant to the assignment of said judgment and on April
15, 1968, plaintiff obtained an order of execution from the
lower court on the unexempt property of Roy Collard
(R. 4). In accordance with the directions in the executon
an employee of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office levied on a 1968 Cadillac 2-Door Hardtop automobile and
stored the vehicle at the Broadway Garage in Salt Lake
City (R. 5, 6).
Shortly after the action of the sheriff's office in
le\7ing upon the automobile, Maurice Anderson filed his
Petition For Interpleader claiming that even though the
Certificate of Title showed himself and Roy Collard to
be the owners of the vehicle, Mr. Collard did not have any
interest in the automobile (R. 6, 7). The court permitted
the interpleader (R. 9) and upon an affidavit of Roy
Collard, (R. 10, 11) the court issued its Order to Show
Cause ordering plaintiff to appear in court on a day certain to show cause why the Cadillac automobile should
not he delivered to Maurice Anderson upon the ground
that he had the sole ownership interest in the vehicle
(B..12).

It seems that on approximately January 25, 1968,
Roy Collard was indebted to Maurice Anderson in the
approximate sum of $30,000 (R. 24 T. 2). In that date
l\Ir. Collard went to see Mr. Anderson "·with a proposition to buy an automobile." Collard told Anderson that
!tr' had a promotion which had just reached the state of
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completion and he needed to make several trips to consummate the deal quickly ( R. 25 T. 3). Anderson was apparently advised by Collard that if he would loan him
the money to buy a car, he, Collard, could pay Anderson
what was owed to him in a very short time (R. 25, T. 3).
Upon these assurances Mr. Anderson bought Mr. Collard
the automobile and took a promissory note from him for
the purchase price (R. 25 T. 3).
The transaction was handled by Mr. Anderson making his check payable to Carleson Cadillac Company in
the amount of $8,200.00 in payment of the car (R. 25, T.
3). The vehicle, a 1968 Cadillac 2-Door Hardtop Fleetwood Eldorado, was registered and titled in the names
of Roy Collard and Maurice Anderson, and as part of
the same transaction Collard delivered his promissory
note in the amount of $8,200.00 dated January 25, 1968,
to Mr. Anderson (R. 25, T. 3). There is no evidence to
show that Mr. Collard transferred title to the automobile and certainly no evidence of any kind to establish
the fact that Mr. Collard transferred title to the vehicle
to Mr. Anderson prior to the time the automobile was
levied upn by Continental Thrift and Loan.
On these facts the lower court found that Maurice
Anderson was the sole owner of the automobile in question and ordered that the vehicle be released from the
writ of execution and delivered to Mr. Anderson.

It is from that order that this appeal is taken.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT, ROY COLLARD, DID NOT HAVE
ANY OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE AUTOMOBILE IN QUESTION.
The testmony of Mr. Anderson, taken at the time of
the hearing on his Order to Show Cause against plaintiff,
is significant though short. Taking the testimony as it is,
and presenting it as favorably as one can for Intervenor it seems obvious to plaintiff that Mr. Anderson had
no ownership interest in the Cadillac automobile at any
time and it was not intended by either himself or Mr. Collard that he have any. It is equally as obvious that what
Mr. Anderson attempted to do was obtain security for
the promissory note delivered to him from Collard.
Anderson testified that Collard came to him and said
that "he had a promotion which had just reached the
state of cmpletion and he needed a car very badly and
with this car he would be able to consummate the deal
nry quickly because he had several trips" to make (R.
25, T. 3). Mr. Anderson further stated that Collard said
that if he (Anderson) would loan him (Collard) the
money to buy a car he was sure he could pay Anderson
·what he owed him in a very few days or a few weeks.
It was testified by Mr. Anderson, ''So I bought him
this car and took a note for it" (R. 25, T. 3).
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Later in his tesitmony l\Ir. Anderson was asked the
following question by his attorney, Eldredge Grant, to
which he responded:
Q.

The purpose of your buying the automobile
for Mr. Collard was to give him the opportunity to earn the money to pay you back?

A.

That is right.

The testimony of Anderson as it relates to what both
he and Collard said and what they intended is (1) that
Collard desired to borrow $8,200 from Anderson so
that he could buy a car, thus indicating that he wanted
to own the car and owe Anderson for the purchase price;
(2) that Anderson approved of the suggestion and he
therefore bought Collard the automobile, indicating that
Collard was the O"wner of it and not Anderson; and (3)
that Anderson took and accepted Collard's note for the
purchase price of the car, indicating that both parties
intended that the automobile was Collard's and the promissory note with the obligations evidenced thereby was
Anderson's, thus giving Anderson the right to proceed
against Collard upon a negotiable instrument if he failed
to repay the purchase eprice of the car.
Appellant's position is buttressed in this regard by
Mr. Anderson, who stated that on May 3, 1968, .Mr. Collard transferred the title to him (R. 25, T. 3, R. 26, T. 4)
and that this was done for title purposes only:
Q.

So the car has, for title purposes, heen given
hack to you?

A.

That is right.
6

Here again it is apparent that after plaintiff levied
upon the automobile Mr. Collard transferred title of it
to Mr. Anderson so that for title purposes only, and not
for purposes of showing who was the actual owner Anderson would appear as the owner of the car. It could
not be more obvious then that this move was a flagrant
attempt by both Collard and Anderson to defeat the legitimate efforts of Collard's creditors to partially satisfy
its judgment.
According to the great weight of authority, ownership of a motor vehicle may be evidenced by possession
of a certificate of title relating to such vehicle, although
such documents do not ordinarily establish conclusively
the ownership of such vehicle, but are merely prima facie
evidence of it. 7 Am. J ur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Secs. 23 et seq. In this regard Utah follows
the general rule establishing that the certificate of title
to an automobile is only prima facie evidence of ownership &nd that the presumption created thereby is rebuttahle. Jackson v. Jones, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235; Swartz
v. TVhite, 80 Utah 150, 13 P. 2d 643; Ferguson v. Reynolds,
52 Utah 583, 176 P. 267. Other Utah cases supporting
this proposition, although not dealing directly with this
identical question, are Dahl v. Pr,ince, 119 Utah 556, 230
P. 2d 328; Stewart v. Commerce Insura;nce Company of
Glens Falls, N. Y., 114 Utah 278, 198 P. 2d 467.
For cases of sister jurisdictions in this regard see
Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal. App. 2d 64, 165 P. 2d 54; Frederico v. Universal C.l.T. Credit Corp., 140 Colo. 145, 343
P. 2d 830; Starr v. TVelch, (Okla.) 323 P. 2d 349; Dicillo
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v. Osborn, 204 Or. 171, 282 P. 2d 611; Jenkin v. Anderson,
12 Wash. 2d 58, 120 P. 2d 548, Supplemented 12 Wash.
2d 58, 123 P. 2d 759.
Appellant contends, and it believes not without a
good deal of merit, that the evidence shows that even
though the title to the Cadillac automobile disclosed both
Maurice Anderson and Roy Collard as the owners thereof, in fact Roy Collard was intended to be and was the
true and sole owner thereof. The implications of a contrary finding are so fraught with inequities as to Mr.
Collard that one can be assured that he did not intend Mr.
Anderson to be the sole owner of the vehicle. Otherwise
the parties have put Mr. Collard in the ridiculous and
unbelievable position of having borrowed the sum of
$8,200 to buy an automobile, having given a promissory
note for the purchase price and being obligated to Anderson on that and then finding himself in the unenviable
situation of not owning the autombile for which he is
obligated to pay.
Certainly it should be apparent that neither Collard
nor Anderson intended this to be the result. It should be
equally apparent that what they did intend was that Collard own the automobile and that he owe Anderson for
the purchase price pursuant to the promissory note.
Again, it seems obvious that by having his name on the
certificate of title, both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Collard
attempted and intended that Anderson have security for
payment of the promissory note given him by Collard.

8

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
AUTOMOBILE RELEASED FROM PLAINTIFF'S EXECUTION BECAUSE INTERVENOR'S ATTEMPT TO RETAIN A SECURITY
INTEREST IN THE VEHICLE WAS DEFECTIVE.
Appellant incorporates by reference into Point II of
this brief th eargument and law set forth in Point I.
Section 70A-9-103(4) Uniform Commercial Code,
U.C.A., 1953, provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is covered by a certificate of title
issued under a statute of this state or any other
jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any security interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction
which issued the certificate.''
Section 70A-9-302 Uniform
U.C.A., 1953, provides as follows:

Commercial

Code,

" ( 1) A financial statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except the following:

* * * *
( 3) The filing provisions of the chapter do not
apply to a security interest in property subject
to a statute
(a) *

*

* *

(b) of this state which provides for central
filing of security interests which is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate
of title is required under the statutes of this
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state if a violation of such a security interest
can be indicated by a public official on a certificate or a duplicate thereof.
( 4) A security interest in property covered bv
a statute described in subsection ( 3) can be pe1:_
focted only by registration or filing under that 1
statute or by indication of the security interest on :
a certificate of title or a duplicate thereof by a
public official. ''
The transaction that occurred between Mr. Anderson and Mr. Collard is not covered by the Commercial ,
Code. One therefore must go to the Motor Vehicle Ar.t
of the Code in order to determine the requisites for validity of an encumbrance on the automobile. The following Code provisions of U.C.A., 1953, are applicable:
"41-1-37. Certificate of title - Contents. The
certificate of title shall contain upon the fare
thereof the identical information required upon
the face of the registration card and in addition
thereto a statement of the owner's title and of all
liens and encumbrances upon the vehicle therein
described, and whether possession is held by the
owner under a lease, contract of conditional sale,
or other like agreement. Said certificate shall
bear thereon the seal of the department.
"41-1-38. Certificate of title Signature of
owner - Notation of liens. - The certificate of
title shall contain upon the reverse side a space
for the signature of the owner and the owner shall
write his name with pen and ink in such space
upou the reverse side forms for assignmeut of
title or interest and warranty thereof by the
owner with space for notation of liens and encumbrances upon the vehicle at the time of a transfer.
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"41-1-80. Filing liens and encumbrances. - No
conditional sale contract, conditional lease, chattel
mortgage, or other lien or encumbrance or title
retention instrument upon a registered vehicle,
other than a lien dependent upon possession, is
valid as against the creditors of an owner acquiring a lien by levy or attachment or subsequent
purchasers or encumbrances without notice until
the requirements of sections 41-1-81 to 41-1-87
have been complied with.
"41-1-81. Filing instrument creating lien or encumbrance. - There shall be deposited with the
department a copy of the instrument creating and
evidencing such lien or encumbrance, which instrument is executed in the manner required by
the laws of this state with an attached or endorsed certificate of a notary public stating that
the same is true· and correct copy of the original
and accompanied by the certificate of title last
issued for such vehicle.
"41-1-82. Instruments to accompany application
for original registration. - If the vehicle is of a
type subject to registration hereunder but has not
yet been registered and no certificate of title has
been issued therefor then the certified copy of
the instrument creating such lien or encumbrance
shall be accompanied by an application by the
owner in usual form for an original registration
and issuance of an original ceTtificate of title. In
every such event such application shall be accompanied by the fee or fees as provided in this act.
"41-1-85. Filing effective to give notice. - Such
filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title
as provided in sections 41-1-81 to 41-1-84, shall
constitute constructive notice of all liens and en11

cumbrances against the vehicle described therein
to creditors of the owner, or to subsequent purchasers and encumbrances.''
As the statutes indicate, no lien or encumbrance or
title retention instrument upon a registered vehicle, other
than a lien dependent upon possession, is valid as against
the creditors of the owner acquiring a lien by levy or
attachment.
In the instant case, Continental Thrift and Loan obtained a. lien against the Cadillac automobile by reason of
a levy of execution on May 2, 1968 (R. 5). At that time
even though both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Collard were
shown as the o\vners of the vehicle in question, it is clear
that both men intended that Mr. Collard was the mvner
of the car and that :Mr. Anderson was shown as an owner,
not because he in fact was one, but because he was attempting to secure payment of the promissory note.
No lien or encumbrance instruments have ever been
filed by or on behalf of Anderson and certainly no lien
or encumbrances shown on the title. Inasmuch as the
statutes of this state specify the method by which a lien
against an automobile is perfected, and inasmuch as
Anderson's attempt to perfect his lien was not in accordance with these statutes, his attempt thereat was defective and he has no valid lien on said automobile.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the position taken
by it in Points I and II of this brief arc well taken.
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In this regard plaintiff again contends that Anderson had no ownership interest in the automobile. His
name was put on the title only to secure payment of the
promissory note. Anderson bought the car for Collard
and took Collard's note in exchange. Plaintiff levied
upon the automobile on May 2, 1968, and Anderson testified, although there is no documentary evidence thereof,
that on May 3, 1968, Mr. Collard transferred the automobile to Mr. Anderson. It is of interest to note that
this transfer occurred the day after plaintiff levied on
the vehicle. This action on the part of Collard and Anderson raises the question that if both Anderson and
Colla.rd actually believed Anderson to be the owner of
the automobile why was it necessary for Collard to transfer title to Anderson on May 3. If they both considered
Collard to be the owner and the action on May 3 was
designed to protect Anderson, then their action was too
late to affect plaintiff's levy of execution.
Based upon the foregoing argument and authorities,
plaintiff takes the position that this court should reve·rse
the order of the District Court directing plaintiff to release possession of the 1968 Cadillac automobile and deliver it to intervenor and order the reinstatement of the
order of execution on said vehicle originally entered by
the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
SPENCER L. HAYCOCK
D. GARY CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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